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1. INTRODUCTION
The agri-food sectors of both Canada and the United States are experiencing a trend towards
closer vertical coordination. This can take a myriad of forms including contracting, strategic alliances,
quasi and vertical integration (Hobbs and Young, 2000).  Questions over the implications for public
policy of closer vertical ties have existed since the 1950s, when changing technology and the nature of
price and production risks were instrumental in driving some U.S. agricultural sectors, such as  broilers,
towards closer contracting and vertical integration. In 1997 about one third of the value of U.S.
agricultural sales were produced under contract. While lack of data makes it impossible to be precise
about the extent of contracting in Canada, contracting has increased and this trend is expected to
continue. For example, an increase in contracting is expected in the Canadian hog-pork sector following
the removal of single desk selling agencies in several provinces in 1997. Identity preserved supply chains
for value-enhanced crops produced on contract are emerging in both countries and co-exist with bulk
commodity grain marketing systems. Genetically engineered corn, soybeans and canola have provided a
further impetus for close vertical relations between producers, processors and retailers. Crops with
enhanced quality characteristics must be produced to tight guidelines and identity preserved in order to
capture their value. 
Changing consumer preferences, biotechnology, information technology, environmental
pressures, credit and risk issues and the reduction of global trade barriers are cited as some of the driving
forces behind changing vertical coordination. Previous work has explored the forces behind closer
vertical coordination (Hobbs and Young, 2000; Schertz and Daft, 1997; Henderson, 1998; Bureau,
Gozlan, and Marette, 1998; and Kalaitzandonakes and Maltsbarger, 1998). Changes in the agricultural
system and the extent  and nature of increased vertical coordination have been discussed by Mighell and
Jones (1963) and Banker and Perry (1999). Conceptual models exploring the economic reasons for closer
vertical coordination have been explored by Williamson (1979), Sauvée (1998), Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hodgson (1998) and Teece et al. (1994). 
This paper investigates the implications for public policy of the move towards increased vertical
coordination in agrifood sectors. The increased importance of contracting brings with it a host of public
policy questions, including legislation affecting contract transparency, terms and negotiation and dispute
settlement. Questions of market power, and associated issues of price discovery and public price
reporting are considered. Finally, the paper discusses how changes in the agricultural sector due toPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 2  
increased vertical coordination affect the role of government in addressing information asymmetry,
sponsoring research and development and in regulating marketing institutions.
 2. PRICE FORMATION AND ASSOCIATED ISSUES
2.1 The Evolution of Agricultural Markets
To be able to discuss the implications of increased vertical coordination in agriculture we need
an idea of what agricultural markets will look like in the future. Most analysts propose that the future will
bring a mix of market types whose importance will change overtime as agriculture continues to
industrialize. Boelhje (1998) suggests that there will be three categories of goods: generic commodities,
enhanced component commodities, and specific attribute raw materials. Boelhje believes that these
products will be produced by at least three categories of agricultural producers. First, he predicts that the
role of multiple plant entrepreneurs will increase, as advances in technology enable skilled producers to
manage sizable operations in multiple locations. Secondly, he believes that some growers will become
franchise growers operating with a system similar to that of McDonald's fast food chains. Thirdly, he
sees networks of qualified suppliers for particular processing operations, such as already exists in the
broiler or pork industry. In Boelhje's opinion, interdependence between components of the supply
system, not independence, will be the keyword of the future.
Hamilton (1997) also proposes three categories of agricultural producers. The first will be an
industrialized portion similar to the broiler industry, where the role of traditional family-sized farms will
be limited. Instead, many farmers will have the status of employee in a sector that is increasingly
concentrated, owned by corporations and vertically integrated. The second sector will be made up of
traditional family farms, probably larger than before, who are attempting to compete within the
industrialized system. Producers may increase their role in downstream activities through marketing
cooperatives or networks. A third group of producers, devoted to producing and marketing high quality
food in nontraditional ways, is likely to grow. This group will include smaller scale diversified producers
and niche marketers.
Brester and Penn (1999) also foresee a role for large family farmers that will continue to produce
bulk (generic) commodities. They also suggest that the number of producers of differentiated and identity
preserved goods will continue to grow. 
None of these forecasts are likely to be entirely accurate, yet they all appear to concur with
respect to a broad trend for the agriculture sector. In general, the evolution of the agricultural sector to-
date suggests that agriculture will be composed of a variety of products, both generic and highlyPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 3  
specialized, and that the role of specialized products is likely to increase for some time. It is likely that
there will be no standard form of agricultural production and that the concept of a representative farm
will continue to decline in usefulness. A mix of organizational forms will exist at the farm level and
within the entire marketing chain. 
2.2 Bulk Commodity Markets
Price discovery in spot markets for homogenous commodities is well understood. For the purpose
of this research, the relevant question is the extent to which the useful properties of spot markets can be
maintained as the portion of production entering the spot markets shrinks relative to the portion that is
priced through contracts or through other mechanisms. The question then, is what is the minimum
number of transactions needed to maintain a viable spot market. Although this question has been
addressed in the past (see for example, Tomek, 1980) it may be difficult to answer on the basis of past
research due to changes in technology. The use of the Internet vastly reduces search and information
costs for buyers and sellers. It expands our traditional notions of the boundaries of a spot market and the
number of potential buyers and sellers. For example, if one were interested in rice, a casual search of the
Web brings up a newsletter on rice with international prices at different locations and with specific
quotes for numerous qualities and varieties of rice (http://www.creedrice.com).
 2.3 Contract Production Pricing and Associated Issues
With the increase in contract production issues have emerged including  price discovery and
fairness, possible abuse of market power, producer access to the supply chain, and other issues related to
contract scope and conflict over contract terms. This section briefly explores these issues. 
2.3.i Formula Pricing
An increasing proportion of agriculture is produced under contracts in both Canada and the
United States. In 1997, in the United States, around one third of agricultural sales were produced under
contract, making issues associated with contract pricing important. Formula pricing schemes are common
for production under contract and involve transactions where the price is determined by formula and may
be tied to a specific market price. In contract grain production, such as for high-oil corn in the United
States, payment is based on No. 2 yellow corn, with premiums based on the oil content of the corn. For
corn, and several other commodities, the spot market plays a key role in providing a base price to which
quality premiums are added. However, in other commodities, a spot market price is not used. For
example, for live turkeys in the United States, the price received by producers from processors is not
related to the spot market price, but to a price quotation by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for
frozen, ready-to-eat turkeys (Hayenga and Schrader, 1980). Public Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 4  
In the United States, formula pricing is used for eggs, both between the producer and first-
handlers, and between the handlers and retail and food service sectors. Hayenga and Schrader (1980)
report on the complicated arrangements that exist:
“Most contracts do not have a clear cut base price or premium established,
just a handler’s commitment to use his “best efforts” to achieve a
“competitive price” for the producer.” (p.755)
The egg price quotations typically used in formula-pricing arrangements are based on Urner-Barry
Producers’ Price Current, which does not represent any specific graded-egg market transaction, rather it
is based on changes in egg prices at other levels of the marketing system, changes in inventory levels and
other factors. These examples lead to the conclusion that formula pricing schemes use a variety of
mechanisms, including but not limited to the spot market price as a basis for their transactions. 
2.3 ii Performance Incentives
The structure of contracts for U.S. broilers usually consists of a payment system containing three
components: (1) the base payment; (2) an incentive or performance payment; and (3) disaster payments
(Perry, Banker, and Green, 1999). The base payment is a fixed payment per pound of meat produced. The
purpose of the performance payment is to reward producers who perform better than average, either
through a bonus for higher than average quality or for a higher than average volume of production. In
these cases, the contract may be structured as a “tournament” between a comparative group of producers
(Knoeber, 1989). Examples of broiler contracts can be viewed at (http://www.web-span.com/pga/
contracts/index.html). Similarly, in this case, payment is not related to a spot market price.
2.3 iii Price and Quality Information
One frequently cited concern over the increase in the use of contracts for agricultural production
is the impact on the viability and existence of a spot market price. The concern is that as the percentage
of production under contract increases the spot market becomes thin, thus, the market clearing price more
volatile and less representative of the value of the good (usually a generic good). While spot market
prices provide useful information, it is important to note that price is only one aspect of contract
production. In many cases, production under contract will differ from generic commodity production, as
contracts are often used to ensure that tight quality specifications are met. In addition, the contractual
relationship may include many facets not captured by production of a bulk commodity, where the spot
market provides a market clearing price. Access to new technology and to the opportunity to produce
new commodities is one motivation to participate in contract production (Boelhje, 1998). In fact,
producers may grow several different grains on contract in order to remain on the lists of qualifiedPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 5  
producers for different companies. This may improve future opportunities to produce new products under
contract and be part of a specific value-added supply chain. 
Contract production is frequently associated with different costs and benefits to the producer
than production for the spot market. For example, closer vertical linkages with processors may provide
producers with access to additional information about the requirements of consumers, thereby enhancing
the flow of market information back down the supply chain. This benefit is hard to quantify but it
represents a reduction in information or search costs for the producer. At the same time, however, the
producer is faced with a more complex transaction situation involving long-term contractual obligations
and may have to choose between a number of potential contractual relationships. This raises information
and negotiation costs for the producer. In general, spot market prices become increasingly irrelevant as
contracts between producer and processors change the nature of their relationship and the specifications
of the product produced. 
It is helpful to keep in perspective what spot market prices provide to agricultural producers. The
interaction of many buyers and sellers assures them that the price is the result of many transactions, and
that a buyer with market power is less likely to have lowered the price. However, this does not mean that
all producers will necessarily earn normal profits, or that they will be able to stay in production over the
long run. Witness the exit over the years from agricultural sectors with viable spot markets. It also does
not guarantee that producers will regard the price as “fair.” In some cases, producers regard a spot market
price as unfair due to subsidies to production given by governments throughout the world. The
international sugar market is often accused of being simply a dumping ground for product, and the spot
market price is not regarded as “fair.” At other times the spot market price is not regarded as fair simply
if it is low. 
2.3.iv Access to Supply Chains
Concern is expressed over issues of market power held by commodity handlers and processors.
One concern is that, in the future, some producers may have difficulty gaining entry to tightly
coordinated supply chains. Difficulty in gaining entry could be caused by requirements for sophisticated
production skills or the need for equipment or capital. The inability of certain producers to gain entry to
supply chains for these reasons would be a continuation of the forces that have prompted producers to
exit from agriculture historically. Another reason why producers might have difficulty gaining entry is
that processors prefer to lower their transactions costs by dealing with only a few producers, who
contract to provide large volumes of the commodity in question. This might give rise to the “multiplant
entrepreneur” that was envisioned by Boehlje (1998). This highly skilled farmer would act as a manager,Public Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 6  
hiring other farmers to assist in production at various locations. Finally, a third reason that entry might be
restricted could be that a dominant processor with market power could act as a monopsonist and purchase
less of the input than would occur in a competitive market. The likelihood of this occurrence depends on
the market’s elasticities, the contestability of the market, and therefore the degree of the processors’
market power, as well as the firm’s overall marketing and/or purchasing strategy. Discussion of the
implications of market power for public policy is continued in a subsequent section.
2.3v Efficiency Gains
An example of the potential benefits of vertical coordination is provided by the U.S. broiler
industry (Martinez, 1999). Due to increased vertical coordination, the broiler industry has been able to
increase its efficiency significantly. Farm production costs declined with the adoption of cost-reducing
technology, facilitated by the use of production contracts. Market efficiencies were gained from vertical
integration of the feed, hatchery, processing and feeding stages. With tighter control the industry was
able to meet consumer needs for high-quality, convenient, and branded products. In addition, contracting
and vertical integration enabled integrators to meet the needs of large scale supermarket chains and
restaurants due to greater control over volume and quality. Martinez (1999) illustrates the shift out in the
supply curve that has occurred, and suggests that there has been a shift out in the demand curve as well.
2.3 vi Collective Bargaining and the Role of Commodity Groups
While there have been clear efficiency gains in some industries due to increased vertical
coordination, the possibility remains that large contractors will use their power to depress the prices paid
for inputs, and to make other contract conditions disadvantageous for producers. This has motivated
producers to form associations to bargain collectively with the processor, in a manner similar to labour
unions. This is a role frequently assumed by producer organizations in Europe. In the United States the
Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA) of 1967 offers some protection to farmers and ranchers who form
associations in order to bargain with handlers and processors for better prices and terms. The AFPA
prohibits handlers and processors from discrimination against or intimidation of producers due to
membership in any organization or due to exercising  their right to organize grower associations.
(Hamilton, 1997).
The protection given to producers through the AFPA is perceived to be inadequate by some
producers and their state governments. For this reason the U.S. states of Maine and Washington have
passed state laws to further protect producers’ right to organize. In addition, the National Contract
Poultry Growers Association (NCPGA) has attempted to pass legislation to extend the protection given
to growers to organize under the AFPA and the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 (RAFI, 2000). OtherPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 7  
groups, such as the Farmer’s Legal Action Group, of St. Paul, Minnesota, have played a role in helping to
organize and educate growers. There is some evidence of success from their efforts.
“Contracts also have changed as a result of the grower’s cooperative
approach...before, the companies would not negotiate..contractors have
become much more flexible in recent months” (Brown, 1992; Marbery,
1993).
In Canada, producers’ rights to organize are protected by provincial legislation.
In addition to collective bargaining, Hamilton argues that commodity groups can play a key role
in the development of fair contract terms. Commodity groups are well situated to bring together large and
small producers, processors, integrators, attorneys, and others to jointly address the development of
contracts that will serve the needs of all parties (Hamilton, 1995). In Great Britain, the National Farmers’
Union, the Grain and Feed Trade Association and the United Kingdom Agricultural Supply Trade
Association have been involved in developing standardized commodity contracts. Hamilton states that
the involvement of producers and trade organizations in developing contacts has facilitated standardized
industry practices and has improved contracts (Hamilton, 1995). The involvement of producer
organizations is also likely to generate greater “buy-in” on the part of producers faced with the option of
joining a closely coordinated supply chain by producing under contract for a specific processor. This
reduces the processor’s transaction costs in locating and negotiating with suitable suppliers.
2.3 vii Transparency and Dispute Settlement
Another concern over the increase in contract agriculture is a potential lack of transparency
regarding the terms used in contracts. This concern can be addressed by requiring that contract terms be
made public. Hamilton (1995) discusses regulations used to achieve transparency in producer-processor
contracts by several U.S. states. For example, South Dakota requires all packers with gross annual sales
of more than $100 million to submit copies of standard contracts, as well as statistics on the method of
purchase, the price and other contract terms (Hamilton, 1995). In addition, producer groups have taken
measures to increase contract transparency. For example, the U.S. National Contract Poultry Growers
homepage (http://www.web-span.com/pga) has contracts posted from numerous poultry integrators.
Accompanying the increase in the use of contracts has been an increase in the number of legal
disputes between producers and processors over the terms of the contracts. For example, poultry growers
have instigated a number of lawsuits against processors over disputes in contract law (Marbery, 1993). 
One response by U.S. states to the increase in producer-processor disputes over contracts has
been to require mediation before allowing a court to hear the case. This approach has been taken by IowaPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 8  
1 See Lang (1980) for an insightful discussion of this issue and an examination of how collective bargaining altered the
incentive structure of various buyer-supplier relationships, leading to a change in behaviour. 
for disputes involving livestock production contracts and by Wisconsin for vegetable contracts. Another
method of dealing with disputes which avoids potentially costly legal battles or the strategic use of the
threat of litigation by firms, is to have the contract specify the arbitration procedures to be followed in
the event of a dispute.
Avoidance of costly disputes may also be facilitated by ensuring that contracts between
producers and processors are complete (in so far as is possible) and equitable to both parties. Hamilton
(1995) discusses a long list of questions that arise with the increased use of contracts, and suggests that
many contracts currently in use do not adequately address these issues. In some cases involving grain
production the question of who owns the grain, and the type of contractual arrangement entered into is
important in determining if producers can participate in U.S. farm programs. Who bears the risk of loss
during planting, growing, harvesting, storage and delivery, potential liability for environmental damages,
and eligibility for worker compensation are other important questions which are often inadequately
addressed. This increases the transaction risk for both parties. Writing fully contingent contracts, on the
other hand, imposes a different set of transaction (negotiation) costs on the parties. 
Another important question is how performance is evaluated, as payment of premiums may
depend on meeting quality standards or achieving target volumes. If disputes arise over the performance
evaluation, will they be resolved through litigation, arbitration, mediation or administrative fiat, wherein
the party with the greater relative bargaining power decides? Finally, questions exist over the timing of
payment, particularly when title to the goods is passed before payment is made.
1 
An evaluation of issues associated with the growth of contract farming should note the evidence
that many farmers are happy with their contracts and plan to continue contract farming (Lewin-
Solomons, 1999), and that many integrators have waiting lists of growers who wish to obtain contracts
but cannot (Hamilton, 1995). Hamilton argues that one problem with contracts is that growers expect too
much. If the processor is providing the technology and marketing strategy that leads to increased profits,
and the grower is not, then it is unrealistic for the grower to expect a portion of those increased profits.
He suggests that the goal of government involvement in contract law should be limited to facilitating a
fair and informed business relation: 
“If the laws are designed to make the parties equal in their economic
power, or to make them share the economic benefits of the contract, then
their purposes are not likely to be achieved...if laws try to makePublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 9  
companies share the benefits, the companies will look for alternatives to
do it themselves...” (Hamilton, 1995).
2.4 Franchises
Some economists, concerned with how agricultural production is likely to evolve, have suggested
that franchises may become important in agriculture due to the potential advantages of these business
relationships to producers (Hayes, 1998; Boehlje, 1998). In most franchising relationships, the franchisor
(or chain) contracts with a small party (the franchisee) to sell a product or provide a branded service to
customers (Lewin-Solomons, 1999). A franchisee pays an initial fee to cover training and site
development fees, which can be quite substantial, and a regular royalty on revenues. It is customary for
the franchisor and the franchisee to have a long-term contract, however, the franchisor usually reserves
the right to change the standards of operation with which the franchisee must conform.
One advantage of agricultural franchising is that the product is branded (Hayes, 1998). Hayes
asserts that funds spent on generic commodity advertising may be better invested in promotion of
branded products. Both Boelhje (1998) and Hayes (1998) argue that franchising may present a middle
ground for producers. While producers may not be able to maintain complete independence, acting as a
franchisee provides more opportunity for profit, skilled decision making and risk sharing than operating
as a low-wage “piece-meal” contractor. 
Franchisees are vulnerable to hold-up from franchisors, as franchisors may act opportunistically
and change the standards of operation, or they may simply decide that a franchisee is not in compliance
with standards and terminate the franchise. The hold-up problem results from the large and specific
assets that the franchisee has invested—it is a highly relationship-specific investment. Lewin-Solomons
(1999) investigates the arguments for, and the consequences of, government regulation of both
franchisor-franchisee and grower-processor relationships, and notes many parallels between the two.
Lewin-Solomons concludes that direct regulation interferes with the parties’ attempts to optimize their
contractual relationship. Collective bargaining by franchisees may address the problem of unequal power
while maintaining flexibility in contract terms.
2.5 Monopolistic Competition
It is likely that high-quality and specialty agri-food products will continue to increase in
importance. The forces behind this growth are primarily consumer concerns about food safety, their
interest in other “process” attributes, their desire for locally grown and fresh products, and a continued
increase in the demand for diverse products. For example, one analyst predicts that “microfarmers”Public Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 10  
(small producers of specialty products) could reach 12-18 percent of agricultural markets in the next
twenty years, serving up to 25 percent of consumers (Smith, 1994).
To the extent that these products are considered to be differentiated goods, this agricultural
sector may be represented by the model of monopolistic competition. In a monopolistically competitive
market, firms face downward sloping demand curves because consumers view a firm’s product as
different from others in the industry. This allows a firm to price its products above its rivals (and above
marginal cost) without losing all its customers. However, as entry is possible, firms are unable to make
economic profits in the long-run. In some instances customers may prefer products whose attributes are
linked to location, such as locally grown produce, or “Big Sky Beef” or “Alberta Beef.” If consumer
loyalty to brands is weak, this sector becomes similar to perfect competition.
There are relatively few policy issues related to price formation in these markets. Some prices are
determined in the spot market, as is the case with farm-gate sales. Others are the result of one-on-one
negotiation between specialty producers and (often small-scale) specialty processors or retailers.
However, there may be policy issues with respect to the labelling or product claims which producers use
to differentiate their products. For example, if claims are made about production methods (organic) or
about the location of production (“Made in Saskatchewan”), there may be a role for industry or public
standards to verify this claim, thereby enhancing the public credibility of the firm’s differentiation
strategy and preventing misrepresentation of products to consumers.
3. IMPACT ON EXISTING AGRICULTURAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS
3.1 Canadian Income Support Policy
In Canada, policy emphasis has shifted towards income support and away from commodity-based
programs. For this reason, a move towards closer vertical coordination likely has fewer direct
implications for the application of existing support programs. The Net Income Stabilization Account
(NISA) provides farmers with a means of protecting their incomes against fluctuations and is not
commodity-specific. To the extent that closer vertical relations might reduce price—and therefore
revenue—fluctuations and provide producers with improved information with which to plan production
and estimate costs, arguably it could reduce the need for income stabilization policies such as NISA. In
general, though, farmers will still have access to the NISA program and its provincial counterparts,
regardless of their involvement in vertically related marketing channels or input supply relationships.Public Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 11  
3.2 Marketing Institutions
Policy implications with respect to regulated marketing systems offer more scope for comment.
Much has been written, debated and disputed about the role of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and its
impact on international markets. It is beyond the scope of this paper to wade into the policy discussion of
the relative pros and cons of the CWB. Instead, it is useful to examine the role of regulated marketing
institutions, such the CWB, from the perspective of their transaction cost impacts and the implications
for vertical coordination.
Historically, the rationale for the CWB and other non-supply management marketing institutions
was the need for countervailing market power for producers faced with oligopoly/monopoly power in
downstream grain handling or food processing sectors and monopsonistic/oligopsonistic power in
upstream input supply markets. In a sense, these producer marketing organizations were put in place to
prevent upstream and downstream firms (e.g. railway companies, grain handling firms, food processors)
from capturing rents from the vertical market system, enabling instead these rents to be divided among
producers. Where does this rent come from? If one accepts, for the moment, that the CWB does not have
market power in world markets, then this rent must come from the Board’s ability to lower transaction
costs in the supply chain and pass these cost savings back to farmers in the form of higher returns for
their grain. 
How, then, might the CWB lower transaction costs? Ostensibly, through its coordinating role in
Canadian wheat and barley export markets. The CWB has a number of departments which contribute to
market intelligence and analysis of market demands and the availability of supplies (e.g. Weather and
Crop Surveillance, Market Analysis, Risk Management, Transportation, Country Services, Planning and
Coordination departments). Information costs are reduced by the ability to coordinate market
development activities with sales functions and with supply predictions. Negotiation costs may be lower
collectively by funnelling export sales negotiations through CWB negotiating teams, who are backed up
by an extensive system of industry information collation and analysis. Monitoring and enforcement of
downstream transactions in export markets is facilitated by the organization’s extensive information base.
For example, because it has a more extensive resource base of personnel and expertise in international
markets, it may be easier for the CWB to determine whether a buyer is acting opportunistically and
reneging on a contractual commitment to purchase Canadian wheat or barley at the pre-agreed price or
whether failure to honour a contractual agreement is for reasons beyond the control of the buyer.
Similarly, non-supply management marketing boards have a transaction-cost reducing role inPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 12  
coordinating marketing activities, conducting market research, reducing information and negotiation
costs, etc. 
If regulated marketing institutions were the transaction cost efficient method of coordinating
downstream marketing activities and exporting, however, it could be argued that they do not also need
statutory monopoly power to achieve their objectives. The rents gained from savings in transaction costs
and from countervailing power would be available to producers without the need to also control the
volume of supply. The extent to which this is the case is an empirical question. Central to this question is
the identification of transaction costs in the downstream marketing of the products and an assessment of
the extent to which the marketing institutions are transaction-cost economizing compared to less
regulated forms of marketing. Further research, with a focus on transaction costs, would help inform this
debate.
In most cases, regulated marketing systems have been established for relatively homogenous
agricultural commodities—wheat, barley, eggs, milk, etc. One of the justifications for these institutions is
that market failure results in an under-investment in research and development, market development and
promotion because of the unbranded, commodity nature of the products. This prevents a private firm
from capturing the rents from investing in R&D, market development or promotional activities.
Therefore, these activities are undertaken collectively by the marketing institution on behalf of the entire
industry. However, a major change occurring in agri-food markets is the increased demand for highly
differentiated food products servicing different consumer segments. For example, so-called “designer
eggs” high in essential omega-3 fatty acids are now on the market. In the UK, a brand of eggs has been
launched that differentiates the eggs on the basis of their guaranteed “salmonella-free” status. The eggs
are sourced only from flocks vaccinated against salmonella and each egg is stamped individually with the
company’s brand logo. The example of  U.S. corn and soybeans indicates ways in which these industries
are differentiating what have traditionally been commodity crops, resulting in a move towards vertical
coordination through contracting.
This raises an interesting question—will Canadian regulatory marketing institutions, such as the
CWB, remain (assuming that they currently are) the transaction-cost economizing method of vertical
coordination as differentiated agricultural products gain in importance relative to bulk commodities?
Would coordination through contracts or strategic alliances between independent firms and individual (or
groups of) farm firms be better placed to reduce transaction costs in the markets for highly differentiated
food products with quality attributes which are “variable and invisible”?  Changes in product
characteristics are likely to alter the characteristics of the transaction, resulting in closer verticalPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 13  
relationships between farmers and downstream food firms. Whether regulatory marketing institutions
still have a role to play in this scenario is open to debate. 
On one hand, it could be argued that the ability to collect and collate information about market
needs and coordinate vertical marketing activities means that these institutions are still transaction-cost
efficient, albeit with a need to adapt quality measurement, payment methods and producer contractual
relationships to reflect the new realities of the food industry. For example, contractual arrangements
between the UK bread manufacturer Warburtons, Agricore and prairie wheat farmers appear to be
successful within the CWB structure (Kennett et al., 1998). 
On the other hand, it may be that the current regulatory structure in some Canadian industries
inhibits the closer producer-processor relationships necessary for efficient information flows and the
further development of value-added products to service specific market needs. Further research into this
issue would make a useful contribution to the ongoing debate over the future of regulatory marketing
agencies in Canada. 
4. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT?
Governments have a role to play in correcting market failure. This therefore begs the question, is
there market failure in closely coordinated agri-food sectors, and if so, what is the appropriate role for
governments? If one categorizes market failure into externalities (positive and negative), public goods,
information asymmetry and monopoly/monopsony power, it is most likely the last three categories in
which the market failure question is most relevant for tightly coordinated supply chains. The chief public
good issue in agriculture is the role of public versus private R&D; there may be numerous information
asymmetry issues, including price discovery and product quality; long-standing questions of the existence
of monopoly/monopsony power in vertically related markets remain. Each of these is discussed in turn
below.
4.1 Public Vs Private R&D
Economic theory predicts that there will be under-investment in research and development
activities if private firms cannot reap the full return from their investment due to free rider problems
created by lack of exclusivity and rivalry of the technological advancement. This has long been an
argument in favour of public R&D expenditure to develop new grain varieties, etc. In the past, once the
germplasm had been released in the form of seed, the developer of that variety could not prevent his or
her intellectual property rights from being appropriated by others in a subsequent crop year, e.g. by the
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production did not lend itself to branding and product differentiation, so that firms could realize returns
from their investments in R&D. In these circumstances, we expect market failure to result in under-
investment in R&D. 
The biotechnology revolution and the differentiation of food products on the basis of intangible
attributes (food safety, process attributes, etc.) has changed this situation in two ways. First, it has
motivated the identity preservation, branding and differentiation of agricultural products. Second,
technological change has enabled the protection of intellectual property rights, for example, the ability to
“switch-off” a plant’s reproduction capabilities means that farmers must purchase new seed for each crop
year, rather than saving seed and re-using the same genetic material. In this way, “life-science”
companies who invest in new crop traits are able to capture the value from this investment to a greater
extent than was possible previously. For example, in the U.S. corn and soybean industries private sector
investment had introduced new input and output trait varieties. The resulting increase in contracting
between seed companies, farmers and grain processors enables those who have invested in the
technology to capture the resulting rents. Of course, the advent of Plant Breeders’ Rights legislation has
also been important in fostering increased private sector R&D expenditure. 
The Dutch potato industry provides an interesting illustration of the incentives for R&D which
are created by a closely coordinated supply chain. Rademakers and McKnight (1998) describe close
cooperation between potato processors and seed potato merchants in the Dutch industry. An important
part of this relationship is the processors’ investment in R&D into new seed potato varieties to suit the
needs of specific markets serviced by the processor. This gives the processors a competitive advantage
over their rivals. The contractual relationships between seed potato merchant, farmer and potato
processor enable the processor to capture the rents from their investment in R&D. This close cooperation
between different sectors of the potato supply chain is cited as one of the reasons behind the exporting
success of the Dutch industry.
Recent technological developments may enable firms to realize returns from their investments in
research and development in a manner not previously possible. For this reason it may be important to
reevaluate public and private sector roles in research and development. Due to the uneven nature of
technological change, this reevaluation would need to be focussed on the level of individual industries.
4.2 Dealing with Information Asymmetry
Market failure due to information asymmetry may impede the formation of closely coordinated
supply chains, thereby reducing the international competitiveness of the Canadian or U.S. agri-food
sectors. This suggests a role for government policy in reducing or eliminating information asymmetry.Public Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 15  
For example, in the provision of information about quality, in the accreditation of quality assurance
schemes and in providing producers with advice about different supply chain alternatives. 
A key issue in closely coordinated vertical markets is price discovery. The public price reporting
role traditionally performed by governments is both less important and less feasible in a closely
coordinated system in which “average prices” are not relevant and price information is not readily
available to public agencies. The argument that “average prices” are no longer a relevant indicator of
efficiency or a relevant guide to production and investment decisions assumes that, in a closely
coordinated system, products will be highly differentiated. Since quality is not “average,” then “average”
prices cannot be used to describe that quality. For a producer, evaluating whether he or she is being
offered a “fair” market price depends on the quality produced. Similarly, for processors, the price offered
a producer depends on the quality attributes of the differentiated product. Both parties face information
costs in setting/evaluating price. If these transaction costs are sufficiently high, the transaction may not
occur and market failure results. This suggests a role for a third party in providing an independent,
objective assessment of the quality attributes of the product to reduce information costs for producers and
processors, thereby facilitating the development of closely coordinated supply chains. 
In a sense, this is the role played by the existing public grading schemes for agricultural
commodities. While existing grading schemes reduce information and negotiation costs, by and large,
they are based on broad, easily measurable, commodity attributes. Reducing information asymmetry in a
sector with highly differentiated agri-food products, will require the provision of far more detailed
information on relative quality attributes (including intangible attributes) than those typically measured
in traditional commodity grading schemes. Thus, although the principle is similar, the application is
likely more complicated. 
Technological advances may reduce measurement costs by enabling firms and/or government
representatives to measure quality attributes more accurately. In some cases, experience and credence
attributes are important to end-users—these are characteristics than cannot be evaluated by visual
inspection or testing prior to purchase. Experience attributes are detectable after purchase and
consumption, whereas credence attributes are those whose quality (or, even, presence) cannot be
determined even after consumption and purchase. Very often these are “process attributes,” such as
whether the product was produced in an environmentally friendly manner, or to certain animal welfare
standards or the presence of genetically modified organisms in a product. Technological developments
may transform experience and credence attributes into search attributes—for example, the ability to
detect the presence of GMOs in a processed product or the texture, taste and palatability of meatPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 16  
products. Others will remain credence attributes (e.g. whether the meat originates from animals reared in
welfare-friendly production systems).
There are two roles for a third party, such as the government, in reducing information
asymmetry. The first is the support of R&D into technologies which reduce quality measurement costs
for experience and credence attributes. A second role is in verifying private sector supply chain audits to
assure the presence (or absence) of credence attributes. In other words, if these attributes cannot be
evaluated through measurement, their presence or absence can be assured through close control and
coordination over the supply chain. For example, suppose retailer A provides a guarantee to consumers
that the pork chops it sells were produced using environmentally friendly and/or animal welfare friendly
production practices. Consumers wishing to purchase pork chops with this attribute will use this
assurance in evaluating the quality of the product. There may be a role for the public sector in verifying
that Retailer A has sufficient supply chain audits in place to validate this assurance. Alternatively, this
role could be played by an independent private sector third party. Some quality assurance schemes
feature verification or audits by independent private firms. 
What, then, is the appropriate role for government? At what stage should verification of quality
information or supply chain audits be the purview of government or be a function which can be
performed by an independent 3
rd party private sector player? This is a difficult question. Fundamentally,
economic theory suggests that governments should become involved when markets fail to allocate
resources efficiently. With the revolution in information technology and other technological
advancements in measurement technology, markets in information provision and accreditation have
become a reality. The public sector may continue to have a role in establishing licensing procedures,
industry standards for the provision of information and accreditation, and facilitating the development of
industry-wide quality assurance schemes. The result may be a common set of industry standards to
improve and verify quality. This reduces information asymmetry, to the extent that downstream buyers
can be assured that a base-level of quality has been achieved by all products receiving the industry-wide
quality assurance mark. However, additional quality requirements specific to that buyer would still result
in some information asymmetry, providing a motivation for closer vertical coordination in order to
control for, or detect, additional quality attributes. 
The changing nature of vertical coordination has altered the information, negotiation, monitoring
and enforcement costs facing producers who must find an appropriate buyer and evaluate supply chain
alternatives. By contrast, in the past, the “marketing” of a traditional agricultural commodity was fairly
straightforward. The producer shipped his/her grain to the local elevator, it was graded according to aPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 17  
recognized grading scheme and shipped to market as a bulk commodity. The producer shipped a truck
load of cattle to the local packer, or perhaps could choose between a number of local packers depending
on the prices they were offering at the time. 
Consider instead the scenario in a closely coordinated sector, in which the producer must decide
which vertically-linked supply chain to join. Perhaps this involves a five or ten year contractual
commitment, with specific obligations on the part of the producer with respect to the quantity, quality
and timing of deliveries. Payment might be based on a combination of product quality attributes, the
quantity or quality targets achieved by the producer relative to other producers in a “tournament” and/or
as a residual of the market return for the final processed product. Access to the market (membership of
the supply chain) may require investment in specific assets. The producer may have to follow proscribed
cultivation or feeding methods, with detailed documentation and on-farm audits an integral part of the
relationship. Periodic consultations with and/or inspection by downstream partners may be involved. The
producer’s ability to improve net farm income through changing the input mix may be constrained by
contractual obligations with respect to input use or choice of input supplier. All of this requires a very
different set of skills for producers. These include skills in contract evaluation and negotiation, and
management skills relevant to being part of a closely coordinated supply chain where the producer’s
autonomy to make decisions is restricted but where he or she has access to more information with respect
to consumer and downstream buyer requirements.
How does this provide a new role for public policy? There is a need for education and advice to
assist producers in obtaining the skills necessary to evaluate different contractual alternatives—where the
risks lie, how performance will be assessed, etc. Alternatively, this is a role which could also be
performed by industry associations or producer commodity groups. 
4.3 Dealing with Monopoly/Monopsony Power
In many cases, closer vertical coordination of the agri-food sector has been accompanied by
rationalization and increasing concentration in the input supply, processing and retailing/distribution
sectors. Monopsony or oligopsony power in downstream sectors and monopoly or oligopoly power in
input supply sectors puts producers at a relative bargaining disadvantage and results in the well-known
economic outcomes of an inefficient allocation of resources and a loss in social welfare. This has long
been an issue in agricultural markets, and in this sense it is nothing new. It was one of the reasons behind
the establishment of the Canadian prairie Wheat Pools early in the Twentieth century, to provide
countervailing power to producers facing geographical monopsonies in grain handling and transportation.
Recently, however, concentration has increased in other sectors—meat packing and processing, the seedPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 18  
industry, genetics, agricultural chemicals, etc.—due to a host of factors, including changing technology
and the globalization of markets. Supply chains consisting of vertically related oligopolies have emerged.
For example, hog packing and processing firms vertically related to hog genetics firms and feed
mills—either through ownership, strategic alliances or contractual relationships. This presents a
challenge for governments in ensuring that a competitive environment is maintained and the social
welfare losses and misallocation of resources which result from an abuse of market power are avoided.
Competition and anti-trust regulations have a pivotal role to play. This is by no means an easy role,
however, given the absence of market price information in a vertically-linked system. Transfer prices
between vertical stages will likely be proprietary information. The role of independent farm producers in
this system and the impacts on consumers in terms of prices and product availability are relevant policy
considerations. 
In applying competition regulations to agri-food markets, however, a balanced approach should
also consider the potential efficiency gains from a more closely coordinated system. Williamson (1985)
discusses the evolution of anti-trust law over the past forty years. He states that in the past anti-trust law
was based on the concept of the firm as a production function, with the corresponding idea that the
efficient boundaries of the firm were determined by technology. The emphasis of anti-trust investigations
was whether or not entry was possible, neglecting benefits from possible gains in efficiency.
Nonstandard methods of contracting were considered to be anti-competitive, as true economies were
assumed to take a technological form. Williamson discusses how the acceptance of Transaction Cost
Economics moved the focus of the analysis used in anti-trust investigations to the transactions the firm
undertakes as the focus of analysis, with an understanding of how organizational variety arises in order to
minimize transaction costs. He concludes that the greater understanding of the firm as a governance
structure increased tolerance of nonstandard, or unfamiliar, business practices that departed from
autonomous market contracting. In addition, a greater appreciation of the efficiency gains from other
forms of organization has led to a more balanced appraisal of the public interest in the evaluation of anti-
trust cases. 
Collective bargaining may be another vehicle to use to address potential monopsony or
oligopsony power. Further research would need to address the questions of: (1) the conditions under
which collective bargaining is appropriate, (2) who would undertake it, and (3) current institutional and
legislative obstacles to collective bargaining.Public Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 19  
4.4 Regulatory Incentives
In the past, governments have exerted direct control over some facets of the agri-food sector, for
example, commodity price support policies, regulated transportation rates, etc. Recently, policy has
become less interventionist and more indirect as a result of a number of factors including a change in
philosophy regarding the appropriate role for government policy, in response to budgetary pressures and
as a result of globalization and international trade obligations. This does not mean that there is no role for
government policy, on the contrary, there appear to be a number of areas in which government action can
mitigate market failure. 
Government policy cannot “regulate” an ideal vertically coordinated agri-food system—in
essence, this was the approach tried in the centrally planned command economies—an “experiment”
which eventually failed miserably. What governments can do, however, is create a regulatory
environment with the requisite incentives for consumer protection and the reduction of information
asymmetry. For example, this might include an evaluation of the costs and benefits of strengthening and
extending product liability laws along the entire agri-food chain and/or requiring full traceability of
products and their ingredients. Sometimes these regulatory requirements in themselves provide the
motivation for closer vertical coordination. This was the case with the 1990 UK Food Safety Act which
increased the legal liability of downstream firms for the safety of all food which they sold—in effect
making them liable for the practices of upstream firms. This led to tighter supply chain control and
coordination as downstream retailers sought to reduce their risks by auditing the practices of upstream
suppliers more closely (Hobbs and Kerr, 1992). 
In other cases, public sector monitoring and enforcement costs can be shifted onto the private
sector. If these monitoring and enforcement activities can be carried out more efficiently and effectively
by the private sector, then there should be a gain to society. One could argue that this is what has
occurred in public sector meat inspection in Canada and the United States. Previously, federal
government employees inspected carcasses for food safety hazards using organoleptic techniques (sight,
smell, touch) which were insufficient to detect microbial hazards. An alternative method of assuring food
safety is to require meat packing plants to follow management procedures which reduce biological,
chemical and physical hazards and include microbial testing by the companies themselves. In essence,
this is the Hazard Analysis, Critical Control Points (HACCP) system which the US government has
mandated for all US meat and poultry and seafood processing plants and which is recommended by the
Canadian government. Properly applied, a HACCP system—combined with microbial testing of
samples—should be a more effective method of delivering safe food to consumers than the previousPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 20  
public visual inspection system. Although HACCP is not currently mandatory in Canadian meat packing
plants, it has been widely adopted because of the importance of the U.S. export market and, in other
cases, because downstream further processors or retailers have made it a requirement of their suppliers. 
With respect to contract agriculture, there are a number of issues that benefit from action by
different levels of government in the regulation of contracts and relations between producers and
processors, including producers’ rights to organize, and requirements to increase the transparency and
adequacy of contracts. It is important to raise the question of the most productive venue for these actions.
If large regulatory discrepancies exist between provinces in Canada, or between states in the United
States, companies may have an incentive to change location. This same concern exists in terms of
discrepancies in the laws governing producer-processor relations between Canada and the United States.
These types of laws and regulations could affect the competitive advantage of firms to the extent that
they would be motivated to change location. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the costs
and benefits of a harmonized system of laws and regulations on producer-processor contracts, efforts to
tackle these public policy concerns in a proactive manner should be considered. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
At the same time that the rapid changes discussed in this paper present challenges to producers
and other industry stakeholders, they also present many opportunities. The agricultural sector that is
emerging promises to be diverse in terms of farm and market organization. This means that producers
may have choices in terms of the niche they fill and how to best realize their comparative advantage. 
Agricultural economists need to reevaluate their traditional preference for a particular form of
farm and market organization for agriculture. Ronald Coase points out that:
“Contemplation of an optimal system may provide techniques of analysis
that would otherwise been missed, and in certain special cases, it may go
far to providing a solution. But in general its influence is more
pernicious. It has directed economists’ attention away from the main
question, which is how alternative arrangements will work in practice. It
has led economists to derive conclusions for economic policy from a
study of an abstract of a market situation” (Williamson, 1985, p. 327). 
Analysis on the actual impacts of increased vertical coordination will continue to be helpful to
policymakers. 
Vertical linkages in agriculture are evolving dynamically, and new research questions are
continually emerging even as we seek to answer existing ones. By design, this paper has taken a broadPublic Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 21  
approach to vertical coordination across the agri-food sector. While there has been a fair amount of
research focussing on vertical coordination in U.S. agriculture, in Canada, industry-specific studies of
vertical coordination are few and far between. In the livestock sector, the Canadian beef and pork sectors
would benefit from an in-depth study of these issues. On the grains and oilseeds side, an analysis of the
canola and specialty crops sectors would provide a valuable comparison with the Canadian wheat
industry. The role of regulated marketing institutions in facilitating or impeding vertical relationships
deserves further attention. Other fruitful areas for research are issues associated with the increased use of
contracts, including potential inadequacies of current contracts and the need for producer education on
evaluating contracts. The potential use of collective bargaining by producers raises a host of research
questions.
The lack of basic data describing the nature of vertical relations, including the extent of
contracting, in Canadian agriculture seriously impedes the ability of policy-makers, industry stakeholders
and researchers to monitor and evaluate developments in the sector. The collection and analysis of
primary data on the nature of vertical linkages in the Canadian agri-food sector should be a priority for
the federal government.
The analysis presented in this paper and the conclusions we have drawn, are far from definitive.
They are intended to suggest that, in upcoming years, producers, downstream processors and retailers,
academics, and policymakers will need continually to reshape their thinking about the organization of
agricultural supply chains and associated policy issues.Public Policy Responses to Increased Vertical Linkages in Agri-food Supply Chains 22  
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